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The objective of this research was to study the relation between the processing and recall of
information in major depressive disorder. An autobiographical memory task was applied to 42 subjects
with a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, 28 subjects with a diagnosis of panic disorder and 51
subjects without any psychological disorder. We used clinical scales for the evaluation of depression
and anxiety. The results of the three groups, and both assessment periods of depressed subjects, were
compared. The results indicate the existence, in severely depressed subjects, of a bias in processing and
recalling negative information. We associate this situation to the existence of negative contents in self‐
schemas and processing and recall of information consistent with these schema contents. Based on the
obtained results, we consider that the onset and maintenance of depression is more related to the
information encoding and recall processes, controlled by the self’s negative schemas, than with
negative thoughts. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Key Practitioner Message:
• The fact that depressed individuals predominantly recall categorical memories should alert therapists
to their presence and the difﬁculties associated with eliciting speciﬁc memories. The importance of
insisting upon a greater memory speciﬁcity as a means to interrupt the depressive bias and the
importance of categorical memories as a possible diagnostic tool of severity of depression should be
taken into consideration.
• A greater focus upon positive memories should be beneﬁcial in therapy.
• An evaluation of the recall characteristics of autobiographical memories in depressed and panic
patients allows for their use in the therapeutic process, in terms of the activation of such memories and
the associations that can be fostered by the therapist.
• The relation between early maladaptive schemas and autobiographical memories allows for a
clariﬁcation of such schemas in therapy by means of the autobiographical memories recalled.
• In a therapeutic setting, a relation can be established between autobiographical memories, attachment
styles and interpersonal relations patterns, concerning panic and depressed patients.
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Faced with the question ‘what is an autobiographical
memory?’, several deﬁnitions can be found. Tulving (1972)
deﬁned autobiographical memories by associating them to
the knowledge preservation regarding an event, experi-
enced by the subject, in a given context; he also differenced
them from semantic memories—the representation of
concepts without the preservation of context. According
to Barsalou (1988), autobiographical memories are com-
posed of generic knowledge and are associated with the
activities that control recall processes. For Conway (1995),
the encoding and construction process of autobiographical
memories has its model in the information related to the
self.
Autobiographical memory is characterized by a good
organization, the preservation of an event’s general
characteristics and the possibility of recall in the absence
of a voluntary decision. Rubin, Wetzler and Nebes (1986)
referred three of its speciﬁc characteristics: (a) they would
be more likely to stray from the reality of the lived event
because they are the individual’s memories and, therefore,
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more susceptible to being transformed and reconstructed,
having temporality a very important role; (b) the tem-
porality through which the autobiographical memories
extend themselves—the individual’s entire life—could
lead to an overlay of the aspects related to the his or her
development and the aspects of the experienced event
that were memorized; and (c) the autobiographical
memories would be intimately related with affection,
which would imply that they had a fundamental part in
organizing the self, and the self would be nuclear in
structuring, encoding and remembering autobiographical
memories.
Searleman and Herrmann (1994) noticed that the
number of autobiographical memories recalled differs
in time, as was demonstrated by the work of Rubin et al.
(1986). The results of their work indicated that indivi-
duals recalled more recent events and that the level of
recall, of a given event, diminished in function of the
time elapsed between its occurrence and the moment of
recall. Peterson (1979) and Watson and Dyck (1984),
from an attributional model standpoint, noticed that the
oldest memories suffered an attributional change pro-
voked by the inﬂuence of the self on those memories,
thereby going from the memories of experienced situa-
tions to the memories of dispositions felt. Searleman and
Herrmann (1994) also mentioned that, given the inﬂu-
ence of temporality, one could observe differences in
recall that were due to the subject’s age. Childhood
amnesia (Eysenck, 2009) and reminiscence (Anderson &
Conway, 1997; Conway & Rubin, 1993; Ruíz‐Vargas,
1991; Searleman & Herrmann, 1994) would be associated
with this situation.
In the process of recalling autobiographical memories,
according to Reiser, Black and Kalamarides (1986), several
elements have an active role: the objectives that the
individual was trying to reach, what was going on at the
time of the event’s occurrence, what triggered it and its
consequences. In a study they performed, the authors
found three recall strategies.
In the ﬁrst strategy, the subjects made a description of
the recall context elicited by the task and, from it, referred
the experience, i.e., they accessed the lived experience
through a new context. This strategy assumed several
forms: (a) the activities’ context that allowed access to a
wide range of information, the action stages, the
objectives that the subject sought to accomplish with his
or her actions and the causal relations between them; (b)
the subject would reconstitute the event given his or her
objectives at the time; (c) the subject could access the
event by recalling the people who were present when it
occurred; and (d) through the temporality of the event,
the subject could have access to the objectives that
characterized that period or to the people with whom
he or she interacted at the time, thereby having two ways
to recall.
In the second recall strategy, the subjects would try,
unsuccessfully, to access the memory of the lived expe-
rience through a category.
Finally, in the third strategy, the subjects would evoke a
different experience from the one asked but that had some
resemblance.
Considering these results, we think it is important to
highlight the nuclear role of temporality in the orga-
nization of autobiographical memory, as emphasized by
Tulving (1972), as well as the importance of context in
accessing these autobiographical memories.
This last aspect is in accordance with the model
proposed by Schank (1982) and Kolodner (1983). They
proposed that the subjects began by recalling the context
of the event’s encoding. Following this line of thought,
Reiser, Black and Abelson (1985) considered that it was
easier to recall an event when it was contextualized than
when it was a general event. The results of their work
reinforced this idea that, in accordance with Schank (1982)
and Kolodner (1983), allowed to state that there exists a
contextual organization of memory, which is variable.
However, several events can exist in a given context,
which implies that the subject would use the speciﬁc
characteristics of the one he or she desired in order to
separate it from others. This process’s target would be the
knowledge structure to which the event’s encoding
context corresponds.
Based on these proposals, some hypotheses regarding
autobiographical memories can be elaborated. The
encoding process would occur taking into account the
event’s relevant characteristics, searching for elements
common to other events, which would allow the
formation of categories, and temporally relating them.
Each encoded event would be related with the subject’s
speciﬁc objectives. This perspective is congruent with
the coding and retention models of Neisser (1986) and
with the approach of Conway and Bekerian (1987).
As for recall, there are several possibilities. Barsalou
(1988) considered recall a search through temporality,
whereas Reiser et al. (1985) considered it a search process
through context. For Williams and Dritschel (1992), it
would be the establishment of objectives through the
word stimulus. According to Skowronski and Walter
(2004), context was fundamental for recall and that a
memory narrative differed according to the recall’s
objective.
Hence, if the narrative’s objective was a description
that would allow the maintenance of the memory of a
given event, the elaboration level would be smaller
than it would if the narrative was made for a third
person or even to oneself in order to understand a
certain event.
Overall, and agreeing with Conway and Rubin (1993),
we can focus on autobiographical memory’s structure
through recall.
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES’ RECALL
AND DEPRESSION
Confronted with the task of recalling a speciﬁc event
triggered by a word, subjects made the mistake of giving
general recalls. Hence, in Pillemer (1984) as well as in
Pillemer and White’s (1989) perspective, subjects did not
recall a theme related to a speciﬁc event but to several
events. This type ofmemory allows a quick and synthesized
access to awide array of information in order to perform the
autobiographical memory task. According to Norman and
Bobrow (1979), the generalization of autobiographical
memory and its quick access to more synthesized informa-
tion is adjusted to an individual’s daily needs.
However, when such a generalization occurs, when faced
with an autobiographical memory task, we are in the
presence of a task performance error that appears in a more
systematic way in some disorders, such as the emotional
ones (Williams & Dritschel, 1992). These authors distin-
guished two categories in these generalizations: (a) cat-
egorical memories that referred to a description of an
intermediate level, which implied a less extensive memory
search and which could be associated with a ﬂaw in the
supervisory attentional system and (b) extended memories,
which occurred when the subject privileged originality—a
memory that is not in accordance with the instructions
given—instead of the temporal framework. These memo-
ries would be older, involve more individualized features
and serve as a response to emotional interpretations.
The characteristics of this type of memory are similar to
extensive memories by Linton (1975, 1979, 1982, 1986) and
to generic memories by Brewer (1986).
According to Barsalou (1988), they work as a way of
organizing autobiographical memories. Williams (1996)
stated that categoricalmemorieswould be the basis for hyper
general memories as, in order to access a speciﬁc memory,
which describes a given time and context, it would be
necessary that the categorical type of search was interrupted.
Williams and Dritschel (1992) performed two studies in
which they used positive, negative and neutral words (the
latter was used only in the second study) in autobio-
graphical memory tasks, with the objective of observing
the differences between categorical and extended mem-
ories, and their possible relation to the ways of encoding,
retention and recalling autobiographical memories. The
results of both studies indicated that (a) subjects produced
more general memories when the recall is triggered by
negative words; (b) the events recalled with negative
words were older than those recalled with other words;
however, more positive events were recalled; (c) more
extended memories were observed when the recalled
events were older and less frequent, and when the words
had an emotional valence, either negative (the highest) or
positive (higher than neutral words); (d) no differences
between latency times and word valence were observed;
(e) it was noted that events of a given period were recalled,
independent of the valence of the stimulus word; this fact
strengthened the possibility regarding the existence of a
temporal structure fromwhich the subject would build his
or her search process; and (f) subjects demonstrated a
preference for using one type of general memory.
In short, regarding these studies, we can claim that there
are differences between the use of both types of general
memory. The aspects that inﬂuence the appearance of
categorical or extensive memories are (a) the subject’s
preference—when one type is used, the other becomes
subordinated to it; (b) the valence of the words used;
(c) age; and (d) the frequency of the event. Hence, extended
memories would be relatedwith older, less frequent events
and with the emotional tone of the stimulus word. They
would be speciﬁc memories because, in order for their
resurgence to occur, the subject had to go through a
discrimination process of mnesic material. In the case of
categorical memories, the opposite would occur.
According to Williams and Dritschel (1992), the
appearance of these categorical memories would be due
to, what Shallice (1988) considered to be, a ﬂaw in the
supervisory attentional system—that would be related
with the evaluation processes, strategy and objectives.
The subject would not be able to discriminate the
objective of his or her memory search and that would
prevent him or her from recalling speciﬁc events. Several
studies have supported a relation between categorical
memories and the supervisory attentional system: studies
of Williams and Broadbent (1986) and Williams and
Dritschel (1988) comparing subjects that had attempted
suicide without psychopathological disorders; work of
Philips and Williams (1998) in which they observed the
existence of a relation between the increase of cognitive
deﬁcit and a decrease in speciﬁc memories, in depressed
elders; and observation of Goddard, Dritschel and Burton
(1996) that there is a strong relation between recall of
categorical memories and a marked incapacity for social
problem solving, in depressed individuals. Peeters,
Wessel, Merckelbach and Boon‐Vermeeren (2002) ob-
served a relation between hyper general autobiographical
memories and the recall of categorical memories in
depression. We could relate these results to the fact that
the depressed individual is focused upon himself or
herself, which would be reinforced by categorical mem-
ories, thereby limiting the possibility of attending to the
environment, in order to solve situations.
As can be veriﬁed from the studies mentioned
previously, one of the main effects of autobiographical
memory bias, in depression, was observed in the relation
between hyper general and speciﬁc memories. Depressed
subjects have shown a tendency to give hyper general
autobiographical memories instead of speciﬁc ones
(Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Kuyken &
Brewin, 1995; Williams & Broadbent, 1986).
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Several other studies point in the same direction.
Dalgleish, Spinks, Yierd and Kuyken (2001) found a
relation between a greater recall of hyper general
autobiographical memories in the presence of positive
words and prediction for onset of depression in subjects
with seasonal affective disorders. Leibetseder, Rohrer,
Mackinger and Fartacek (2006) observed a relation
between an inferior number of speciﬁc autobiographical
memories, in depressed individuals, and suicide at-
tempts. Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz and Merckelbach
(2001) noted a relation between the severity of
depression and the onset of a bigger number of hyper
general autobiographical memories. Mackinger et al.
(2004) found a predictive relation between the recall of
speciﬁc memories, in the presence of positive and
aggressive words, in a 65‐patient sample going through
alcoholic detoxiﬁcation, and the remission of depressive
symptoms.
Moreover, Raes et al. (2006) related the recall of hyper
general autobiographical memories with difﬁculties in the
identiﬁcation of the different factors, which would allow
the recognition of an event’s speciﬁcity. In this study, they
found a relation between vulnerability to depression and a
reduced number of speciﬁc memories. This relation
between autobiographical memory changes and vulner-
ability to depression is also stated in the work by Peeters
et al. (2002). Rumination was another factor that was
pointed out, by these authors, as being related to the smaller
number of speciﬁc memories, recalled by depressed
individuals. Ramponi, Barnard and Nimmo‐Smith (2004)
classiﬁed hyper generalization as a memory deﬁcit that
prevents recall of an event’s speciﬁc characteristics. They
too related this deﬁcit to rumination. This relation between
a bigger number of hyper general memories, in depres-
sion, and rumination has also been stated in several other
studies (Raes et al., 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004;
Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000; Williams 2004;
Williams et al., 2007).
These biases in the recall of autobiographical memories,
in depression, could be explained by the, previously
stated, idea that individuals would create a general
context for the recall of autobiographical memories, from
which they would search for the speciﬁc event. Depressed
individuals only do the ﬁrst part of the process since, by
accessing a categorical description, they avoid accessing
the speciﬁc event that would be associated with emotion-
al contents.
A relation between a more frequent use of general
memories and an avoidance of recalling traumatic
material was also observed in depressed women who
had been victims of child sexual abuse (Kuyken & Brewin,
1995), as well as in militaries with post‐traumatic stress
(McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995). Kuyken,
Howell and Dalgleish (2006) realized that, in depressed
teenagers, the number of hyper general autobiographical
memories was lower for those that had reported the
traumatic event in comparison with those who had not.
Kremers, Spinhoven, Van der Does and Van Dyck (2006)
noticed that in borderline individuals, with co‐morbid
depression, the number of hyper general autobiographical
memories was superior to the number of speciﬁc
memories. Another consequence has to do with the
several connections established between categorical de-
scriptions, situated at a certain level, which would allow
for an interactive movement through the network of
negative relations, which would become more complex,
as it was conducted by a self‐reference process. This
process contributed to the encoding by supplying the
general characteristics of events associated with the
emotions that it had spurred.
Hence, instead of generating the recall of a speciﬁc event,
a stimulus would lead to the activation of these connec-
tions, reinforcing the mnemonic interlock (Williams, 1992,
1996). According to Williams (1996), in the face of a
request to recall a speciﬁc memory, which refers to the
self, subjects recall generic memories. This phenomenon
can be understood according to claims of Conway and
Pleydell‐Pearce (2000) and Williams (2004) of a hier-
archical process at the level of speciﬁc autobiographical
memory recall. This movement, which would take place
in the executive or central processes, begins with a
search for memories of generic events and then moves
to memories of speciﬁc events. These aspects would lead
depressed subjects to show, especially when recalling
positive events, a more frequent recall of generic events
than that showed by non‐depressed individuals (Moore,
Watts, & Williams, 1988).
Overall, the use of a greater number of general memories
seems to be related to the fact that depressed individuals
encode their events in a general way.
According to Williams (1992), the depressed subject
encodes speciﬁc events according to their affective
valence. Therefore, the encoding is carried out in general
schemas that represent positive and negative experi-
ences. This form of encoding makes it difﬁcult to access
speciﬁc memories. This seems to be the encoding
scenario for events with a high affective signiﬁcance.
This aspect, associated with the fact that depressed
individuals have difﬁculty encoding several elements of
an event that happened at the same time, implies that
the affect experienced during the event is the nuclear
element of the encoding. As a consequence, it is at this
level that the process of self‐referent material occurs.
Thus, when the depressed individual accesses his or her
memories by means of the encoded emotional valences,
even if he or she modiﬁes his or her mood, the recall of
general memories will always be facilitated (Williams,
1992). We can therefore claim that this is more a
structural limitation than an effect congruent with the
mood state.
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However, mood congruency effects are also quite
inﬂuential in memory, especially in depressed individ-
uals (Baddeley, 2009; Power & Dalgleish, 1997). Due to
mood congruency effects in encoding and remember-
ing, there is a negative bias that leads to a preference
for negative information processing, which naturally,
has a great inﬂuence in the autobiographical memories
recalled.
OBJECTIVE
In this study, we intended to compare an autobiograph-
ical memory task with the answers given by depressed
subjects, subjects with a panic disorder and subjects
without psychopathological disorders. We will also
compare the depressed subject’s answers at two different
evaluation moments in order to analyse the relation
between the recall of autobiographical memories and
severity of depression.
Considering autobiographical memories as being
closely related to the self and taking into account the
existence of a negative self model in depressed subjects,
the following questions were asked. (a) Does the
negative self perspective, found in depressed indivi-
duals, condition the emotional valence of the recalled
autobiographical memories? (b) Does the emotional
valence of the stimulus words used in the task affect
the valence and type of the recalled autobiographical
memory?
We considered the existence of a bias between the
encoding, retention and recall of information in depressed
subjects. This bias would become more severe as
information became more related to the self.
Depressed subjects would also have a greater difﬁculty
in accessing speciﬁc memories, reducing their autobio-
graphical memories to the general memories level.
The following hypothesis were also elaborated:
(a) depressed subjects would recall more negative content
autobiographical memories than the other groups stud-
ied; (b) depressed subjects would recall more autobio-
graphical memories when the stimulus word was
negative, compared with when the stimulus word was
positive or neutral; (c) depressed subjects would recall
more autobiographical memories than the other groups
when the stimulus word was negative; (d) depressed
subjects would present quicker response times in negative
words by comparison with positive or neutral words; and
(e) depressed subjects would present a bigger number of
categorical memories than extended ones, when com-
pared with the other two groups.
We considered the same hypothesis when comparing
both evaluations moments of the depressed subjects,
taking into consideration the different degrees of
depression.
METHOD
Participants
Subjects with a Diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder
The sample of subjects with major depressive disorder
consisted of 42 subjects: 30 subjects to which all instru-
ments were applied and 12 subjects to which the
Hamilton Rating Scales for Depression and Anxiety was
not applied. The inclusion criteria for our sample were (a)
having had one or more major depressive episodes; to
classify the episodes, we considered the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition
(DSM‐IV) diagnostic criteria; (b) being without psycho-
pharmacological medication or having had a stabilized
medication for at least 3months; (c) being able to read and
write; and (d) having no marked disturbances of visual
capacity. The aspects referred in points (c) and (d) were
common to the other groups. The average age was
45 years, and 81% were women. Most subjects (74%) had
been on antidepressive medication for at least 3months.
Subjects with a Diagnosis of Panic Disorder
This sample consisted of 28 subjects: 15 to which all
instruments were applied and 13 to which the Hamilton
Rating Scales for Depression and Anxiety was not
applied. The inclusion criteria for this sample were as
follows: (a) having panic disorder (with or without
agoraphobia); to classify the episodes, we considered
the DSM‐IV diagnostic criteria and (b) being without
psychopharmacological medication or having had a
stable medication for at least 3months. The average age
was 36 years, and 75% were women. 82% had been on
anxiolytic medication for at least 3months.
Subjects without Psychopathological Disorders
This sample consisted of 51 subjects. The inclusion
criteria for this sample were as follows: (a) no past or
recent history of psychopathological disorders and (b) no
past or recent history of using psychopharmacological
medication. The age average was 40 years. Female
subjects represented 77% of the sample.
Instruments
Autobiographical Memory Task
In this task, 30 nouns were used, 10 positive (like
happiness and loyalty), 10 negative (such as loneliness
and selﬁshness) and 10 neutral (like ﬂoor and chair).
The nouns selected were those that presented a higher
frequency in a 350‐student sample, to whom this task was
applied in three distinct moments. In the ﬁrst moment, the
students were given a blank sheet of paper containing the
following instruction: ‘Write down twenty nouns that you
consider having positive characteristics’. In the second
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moment, after the blank sheet was collected, the students
were given another one with the following instruction:
‘Write down twenty nouns that you consider having
negative characteristics’. In the third and ﬁnal moment,
after the second blank sheet was collected, the students
were presented a third one with the following instruction:
‘Write down twenty nouns that you consider having
neutral characteristics’.
After analysing the responses, we were able to obtain
the 10 most frequent used nouns for each category—
positive, negative and neutral.
The nouns were presented in a pseudorandom way,
since there could never be more than two of the same
valence being shown consecutively.
Instruction
Before the presentation of the ﬁrst noun the subject was
told ‘Some words will appear on the screen. I want you to
read each word attentively and tell me an event from your
life that this words reminds you of. There aren’t right or
wrong answers since the events are different for different
individuals’. Before projecting each word on screen, the
subject was told ‘And this word, what event of your life
does it remind you of?’
Noun Presentation
The exposure time for each of the nouns was of 1min.
The subject’s answers were audio recorded after the
necessary consent was given.
The nouns were presented to the subjects on a computer
screen. The words were written in capitals and in black, over
a white background. PowerPoint was the program used.
Clinical Instruments
The following clinical instruments were used:
1. the Portuguese version of theHamilton Rating Scale for
Depression (Hamilton, 1960), designed by Hamilton in
1957 and published, for the ﬁrst time, in 1960;
2. the Portuguese version of the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, & Mendelson, 1961);
3. the Portuguese version of theHamilton Rating Scale for
Anxiety (Hamilton, 1959), translated by Luísa Figueira;
4. the Portuguese version of the State and Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI; Y Form; Spielberger, 1983), trans-
lated by Américo Baptista; and
5. the Portuguese version of the Adult Sub‐verbal Test of
the Wechsler Scale, translated by Leandro de Almeida.
Follow‐up
Three months after the ﬁrst evaluation, a group of 30
individuals was evaluated. The objective of this second
evaluation was to compare the two assessment moments,
regarding the experimental task, and to see whether a
change in the severity of depression would imply
differences in autobiographical memories, since between
the ﬁrst and second moments, there could have been
changes, due to either psychological or psychopharma-
cological treatment. Hence, we evaluated this group on
two occasions, separated by a 3‐month period. We chose
this period for two reasons: (a) to allow the possibility of
change in the subject’s level of depression and (b) to
reduce the memory effects on the evaluation tasks.
RESULTS
In the statistical analysis, whenever it was necessary to
resort to multiple statistical tests, we used the Bonferroni
correction, in order to reduce the possibility of error.
Analysis of the Results of the Clinical Scales
In the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, we observed
that in the depressed individual’s ﬁrst evaluation, the
average was 13.1, with a standard deviation (SD) = 5.65,
which was signiﬁcantly higher (t(29) = 2.18, p= 0.037) than
the one recorded in the second evaluation (M= 10.5,
SD= 5.12) (see Table 1).
In the BDI, the average of the ﬁrst evaluation was 19.5,
with a SD=8.56, and the average of the second evaluation
was 18, with a SD=10.43. No signiﬁcant differences
between both averages were observed (t(29) = 1.05,
p= 0.304) (see Table 1).
In both evaluations, a signiﬁcant positive correlationwas
observed between both depression measures—(p< 0.05)
with r= 40 in the ﬁrst evaluation and (p< 0.01) with r= 0.59
in the second evaluation.
The three groups presented a signiﬁcant difference in
the BDI, F(2, 118) = 39.9, MS= 89.10, p= 0.000.
The depressed subjects presented a signiﬁcantly higher
severity of depression (p< 0.05) when compared with the
subjects without psychological disorder. Regarding the
subjects with a panic disorder, they also recorded a
signiﬁcantly higher average than those without psycho-
logical disorders (p< 0.05), and their average was much
closer to the one of the depressed subjects (see Table 2).
In the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety, the depressed
subject’s ﬁrst evaluation average was 18.7, with a
SD=6.92, whereas the second evaluation average was
15.5, with a SD= 7.50. The difference between both
averages was signiﬁcant (t(29) = 3.96, p = 0.000) (see
Table 1).
In both evaluations, the STAI State score had a
signiﬁcantly higher average in the ﬁrst evaluation
(M=60.2 and SD=0.91, t(29) = 4.15, p= 0.000) and in the
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second evaluation (M= 51.3 and SD=10.63, t(29) = 2.59,
p= 0.015) when compared with the STAI Trait score (ﬁrst
evaluation: M= 53.9 and SD= 4.37; second evaluation:
M= 44.8 and SD=9.32) (see Table 1).
In the ﬁrst evaluation, the STAI State score had
signiﬁcantly higher averages, (t(29) = 2.70, p= 0.011)
when compared with the second evaluation (see
Table 1).
The averages of STAI Trait, in both evaluations (ﬁrst
evaluation: M= 53.9 and SD= 4.37; second evaluation:
M= 44.8 and SD=9.32), did not show signiﬁcant differ-
ences, t(29) = 0.916, p= 0.367 (see Table 1).
Depressed subjects presented STAI State and Trait
values that were signiﬁcantly higher (p< 0.05) than the
ones recorded by subjects with panic disorder and by
those with no disorders. The latter presented signiﬁcantly
lower scores (p< 0.05) in both scales, when compared
with the panic disorder group (see Table 2).
In both evaluations of the depressed subject, a signiﬁcant
correlation (p< 0.05) was found between STAI Trait and
Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety—r= 0.48 in the ﬁrst
evaluation and r= 0.40 in the second evaluation—that was
not found between this scale and the STAI State, for any of
the evaluations.
The groups studied did not present signiﬁcant differ-
ences in theirWechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Vocabulary
Subtest, F(2, 118) = 2.72, MS= 93.26, p= 0.070.
Analysis of the Results of the Autobiographical
Memory Task
Analysis of the Total of Events Recalled
Observing the comparison between both evaluations
of the depressed subjects (see Table 3), we noticed, in
the ﬁrst evaluation, a total events’ average (M= 26.1
and SD= 11.25) greater than the one registered in
Table 2. Averages, standard deviation and signiﬁcance of the differences between averages of depressed subjects (depressed), panic
disorder subjects (panic) and no psychopathological disturbance subjects (normal) in Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, Beck
Depression Inventory, Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety, State and Trait Anxiety Inventory State and State and Trait Anxiety
Inventory Trait
Depressed Panic Normal F df MS p
n= 42 n= 28 n= 51
M SD M SD M SD
BDI 23.9** 1.52 15.2** 10.88 6.4** 6.12 39.9* 2, 118 89.10 0.000
STAI State 60.2** 0.91 51.3** 10.63 36.6** 10.39 57.3* 2, 118 113.14 0.000
STAI Trait 53.9** 4.37 44.8** 9.32 35.7** 10.39 28.0* 2, 118 135.72 0.000
BDI =Beck Depression Inventory. df = degrees of freedom. SD= standard deviation. STAI = State and Trait Anxiety Inventory.
*Signiﬁcant difference (p< 0.05) in the ANOVA between the three groups.
**Signiﬁcant difference (p< 0.05) in Tukey test between both groups in a given factor.
Table 1. Averages, standard deviation and signiﬁcance of the differences in averages between depressed subject’s ﬁrst and second
moments of evaluation, regarding Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, Beck Depression Inventory, Hamilton Rating Scale for
Anxiety, State and Trait Anxiety Inventory State and State and Trait Anxiety Inventory Trait
Depressed Depressed t df p
First evaluation Second evaluation
n=30 n= 30
A SD A SD
Hamilton Depression Rating Scale 13.1 5.65 10.5 5.12 2.18 29 0.037*
BDI 19.5 8.56 18.0 10.43 1.05 29 0.304
Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale 18.7 6.92 15.5 7.50 3.96 29 0.000*
STAI State 58.3† 11.42 53.6‡ 10.49 2.70 29 0.011*
STAI Trait 48.3† 12.50 46.6‡ 12.21 0.916 29 0.367
BDI =Beck Depression Inventory. df = degrees of freedom. SD= standard deviation. STAI = State and Trait Anxiety Inventory.
*Signiﬁcant difference between the averages of both groups.
†t(29) = 4.14, p= 0.000.
‡t(29) = 2,59, p= 0.015.
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the second evaluation (M= 24.2 and SD= 10.18). How-
ever, this difference was not signiﬁcant, t(29) = 1.54,
p= 0.134.
As can be observed in Table 4, depressed subjects
presented a total recalled events’ average (M= 22.9 and
SD= 12.46) superior to the one recorded by subjects
with panic disorder (M= 19.2 and SD= 7.83) and by
subjects without psychological disorders (M= 19.0 and
SD= 6.79). However, the differences between the three
groups were also not signiﬁcant (F(2, 118) = 2.30, MS=
87.55, p= 0.105).
Analysis of the Valence of Recalled Events
Comparing both evaluations of depressed subjects (see
Table 3), we observed that in both evaluations, the
averages of negative events recalled (ﬁrst evaluation:
Table 4. Averages, standard deviation and signiﬁcance of the analysis factors of the autobiographical memory task in subjects with a
diagnosis of major depressive disorder (depressed), subjects with a panic disorder (panic) and subjects without psychological disorder
(normal)
Depressed Panic Normal
n=42 n=28 n= 51
A SD A SD A SD
Total events recalled 22.9 12.46 19.2 7.83 19.0 6.79
Total of negative events recalled 13.7† 7.83 12.1§ 4.70 10.8†† 4.86
Total of positive events recalled 8.0† 5.06 7.0§ 4.22 8.1†† 3.51
Total events recalled in negative words 9.1‡ 6.89 7.4¶ 2.92 6.9‡‡ 2.85
Total events recalled in positive words 7.1‡ 4.57 6.4 3.37 6.0‡‡ 3.17
Total events recalled in neutral words 6.6‡ 3.47 5.4¶ 3.11 6.1 2.54
Latency time in negative words 56.9* 39.19 32.3* 28.69 35.3* 38.63
Latency time in positive words 59.0* 48.10 32.0* 29.94 31.7* 38.11
Latency time in neutral words 53.0* 39.15 26.6* 27.48 28.7* 29.68
Signiﬁcant difference (p< 0.05) in the Student’s t test between different factors of the same group.
†t(41) =−5.35, p= 0.000.
‡t(41) = 2.06, p= 0.46.
§t(41) = 2.59, p= 0.013.
¶t(27) =−6.28, p= 0.000.
††t(27) =−4.69, p= 0.000.
‡‡t(49) =−3.36, p= 0.002.
*Signiﬁcant difference (p< 0.05) in the Tukey test between different pairs of groups in a given factor.
Table 3. Averages, standard deviation and signiﬁcance of the factors of analysis of the autobiographical memory task in depressed
patients (depressed) in the ﬁrst and second evaluations
Depressed Depressed t df p
First evaluation Second evaluation
n= 30 n=30
A SD A SD
Total events recalled 26.1 11.25 24.2 10.18 1.54 29 0.134
Total of negative events recalled 15.5† 7.36 14.6§ 6.75 0.903 29 0.374
Total of positive events recalled 8.6† 4.59 8.1§ 4.60 0.839 29 0.408
Total events recalled with negative words 10.6‡ 6.93 9.5 6.39 1.96 29 0.060
Total events recalled with positive words 8.2 4.27 7.4 3.42 1.41 29 0.168
Total events recalled with neutral words 7.3‡ 3.22 7.4 3.68 −0.210 29 0.835
Latency time in negative words 66.5 41.12 55.7 39.75 1.83 29 0.077
Latency time in positive words 69.2 49.77 60.1 45.10 1.02 29 0.314
Latency time in neutral words 59.0 40.82 60.7 51.03 −0.179 29 0.859
df =degrees of freedom. SD= standard deviation.
†t(29) =−5.17, p= 0.000.
‡t(29) = 2.68, p= 0.012.
§t(29) =−4.83, p= 0.000.
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M=15.5 and SD=7.36; second evaluation: M=14.6 and
SD=6.75) were signiﬁcantly superior to the averages of
positive events (ﬁrst evaluation: M=8.6 and SD=4.59;
second evaluation: M= 8.1 and SD= 4.60, t(29) = 5.17,
p= 0.000 and t(29) =−4.83, p= 0.000). In the ﬁrst evalu-
ation, the average of negative recalled events was higher
than in the second evaluation, whereas the average of
positive recalled events was quite similar in both eval-
uations. In either case, the difference in averages was not
signiﬁcant, t(29) = 0.903, p = 0.374 and t(29) = 0.839,
p= 0.408.
In all groups, the average of negative recalled events
was signiﬁcantly superior in comparison with positive
recalled events, t(41) =−5.35, p= 0.000 in depressed sub-
jects, t(27) =−6.28, p= 0.000 in panic disorder subjects,
t(49) =−3.36, p= 0.002 in subjects without psychological
disorders (see Table 4).
In depressed subjects, the average of negative events
recalled was 13.7 (SD= 7.83), whereas the average of
positive events recalled was 8.0 (SD=5.06) (see Table 4).
In panic disorder subjects, the average of negative
events recalled was 12.1 (SD=4.70) and 7.0 (SD= 4.22) for
the positive ones (see Table 4).
In subjects without psychological disorders, the average
of negative events recalled was 10.8 (SD= 4.86), and the
average of positive events recalled was 8.1 (SD=3.51) (see
Table 4).
From the intergroup comparisons, we can see that there
were no signiﬁcant differences (p> 0.05) between different
groups regarding the recall of positive and negative
events (positive events: F(2, 118) = 0.62, MS = 18.26,
p= 0.538; negative events: F(2, 118) = 2.80, MS= 36.34,
p= 0.065) (see Table 4).
Analysis of the Events Recalled by Grouping the Words in
Accordance to Their Valence
For this analysis, we grouped the stimulus words
according to their valence—negative, positive and neu-
tral. Afterwards, we compared the results concerning the
recall of events and the latency times.
Negative words. In the depressed patient’s ﬁrst evaluation,
the average of recalled events with negative words
(M = 10.6 and SD = 6.93) was signiﬁcantly higher,
t(29) = 2.68, p= 0.012, than the average of the events
recalled with neutral words (M=7.3 and SD= 3.22) (see
Table 3).
The averages of events recalledwith negative andpositive
words were not signiﬁcantly different (t(29) = 1.82,
p= 0.079) (see Table 3).
In the depressed patients’ second evaluation, the
average of events recalled with negative words, 9.5
(SD = 6.39), was not signiﬁcantly different from the
averages observed in the two other sets of words
(positive: t(29) = 1.65, p = 0.110; neutral: t(29) = 1.64,
p= 0.112) (see Table 3).
The averages, regarding the depressed patients, did
not differ signiﬁcantly between both evaluation moments
(t(29) = 1.96, p= 0.060) (see Table 3). However, the average
registered in the ﬁrst evaluation (M= 10.6 and SD= 6.93)
was superior to the one registered in the second
evaluation (M= 9.5 and SD= 6.39).
Negative words were the ones that led to a greater recall
of events in all groups (see Table 4). The averages of events
recalled by these words were signiﬁcantly higher in the
following cases (p< 0.05): (a) in depressed subjects (M=9.1
and SD=6.89) in relation to the average of events recalled
with positive words (M= 7.1 and SD= 4.57), t(41) = 2.06,
p = 0.046 and neutral words (M = 6.6 and SD= 3.47),
t(41) = 2.59, p= 0.013; (b) in subjects with panic disorder
(M= 7.4 and SD=2.92) in relation to the average of events
recalled with neutral words (M= 5.4 and SD= 3.11),
t(27) = 6.28, p= 0.000; and (c) in subjects without psycho-
logical disorders (M=6.9 and SD=2.85) regarding the
average of events recalledwith positivewords (M= 6.0 and
SD= 3.17), t(49) = 3.24, p= 0.002 (see Table 4).
In a comparison analysis between groups, we observed
that, although depressed subjects presented a superior
average, the three groups did not present signiﬁcant
differences among themselves in the recall of events with
negative words, (F(2, 118) = 2.62, MS= 21.89, p= 0.077)
(see Table 4).
Positive words. Comparing the depressed subjects in both
evaluative times, we noticed that in the ﬁrst evaluation, the
average was 8.2 (SD=4.27), whereas in the second evalu-
ation, it was lower (M=7.4 and SD=3.42). This difference
was not signiﬁcant, t(29) =1.41, p=0.168 (see Table 3).
The depressed subjects had an average of 7.1 (SD= 4.57)
(see Table 4). This result, despite being higher than the
ones observed in subjects with panic disorder (M=6.4
and SD=3.37) and in subjects without psychological
disorders (M=6.0 and SD=3.17), was not signiﬁcantly
different (F(2, 118) = 1.08, MS= 14.11, p= 0.341).
Neutral words. The average results of depressed individ-
uals were very similar in both evaluation periods, as in
the ﬁrst evaluation, the average was 7.3 (SD=3.22) and in
the second, it was 7.4 (SD= 3.68) (see Table 3).
The depressed subject’s average (M= 6.6 and SD= 3.47)
was higher than the one observed in subjects with panic
disorder (M=5.4 and SD=3.11) and close to the one
registered by subjects without psychological disorders
(M= 6.1 and SD=2.54) (see Table 4). However, between
the three groups, there were no signiﬁcant differences,
F(2, 118) = 1.52, MS= 9.15, p= 0.223.
Latency times for negative words. In the depressed patients’
ﬁrst evaluation, the average registered (M= 66.5 and
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SD=41.12), although superior to the one in the second
evaluation (M=55.7 and SD= 39.75), was not signiﬁcantly
different, t(29) = 1.83, p= 0.077 (see Table 3).
The latency time’s average in depressed subjects
(M = 56.9 and SD = 39.19) was signiﬁcantly longer
(p< 0.05) than the one observed in subjects with panic
disorder (M=32.3 and SD=28.69) and in subjects without
psychological disorders (M=35.3 and SD= 38.63) (see
Table 4). Between the last two groups, there were no
signiﬁcant differences (p> 0.05).
Latency times for positive words. Comparing both evalua-
tions of depressed subjects, we noticed that, although the
averages did not differ signiﬁcantly (t(29) = 1.02,
p= 0.314), the ﬁrst evaluation (M= 69.2 and SD=49.77)
had a higher average than the second evaluation (M= 60.1
and SD= 45.10) (see Table 3).
The depressed subjects presented an average latency
time (M = 59.0 and SD = 48.10) signiﬁcantly longer
(p< 0.05) than the one observed in subjects with panic
disorder (M=32.0 and SD=29.94) and in subjects without
psychological disorders (M= 31.7 and SD=38.11) (see
Table 4).
Latency times for neutral words. In the depressed patients’
second evaluation, the average (M=60.7 and SD=51.03)
was higher than that in the ﬁrst evaluation (M= 59.0 and
SD=40.82), although the difference did not prove to be
signiﬁcant, t(29) =−0.179, p= 0.859 (see Table 3).
Also, the depressed patients’ average (M=53.0 and
SD=39.15) was signiﬁcantly higher (p< 0.05) than the
averages of subjects with panic disorder and subjects
without psychological disorders (26.6 [SD= 27.48] and
28.7 [SD=29.68], respectively) (see Table 4).
Analysis of Categorical and Extended Memories
In the depressed subjects’ ﬁrst evaluation, we noticed
that in 70% of the words, they recalled ‘categorical
memories’. In their second evaluation, they recalled
‘categorical memories’ in 67% of the words.
Depressed subjects, in most words (76.7%), recalled
more ‘categorical memories’ than ‘extended memories’.
Individuals with panic disorder recalled, in most words
(60%), ‘extended memories’. Furthermore, subjects with-
out any psychological disorders recalled ‘categorical
memories’ and ‘extended memories’ with exactly the
same number of words, 12.
Analysis of Latency Times per Words
Regarding each word’s latency time, it is important to
state that the time limits considered for depressed subjects
(≥6.0 and ≤4.0) were different from those given to
subjects with panic disorder (≥5.0 and ≤2.0) and without
psychological disorders (≥4.0 and ≤2.0). This difference
revealed that depressed subjects presented longer latency
times when compared with the subjects of the two other
groups.
The depressed subjects presented a higher number of
words with longer latency times, with a total of 10
words (four negative, four positive and two neutral),
followed by the subjects without psychological disor-
ders, with a total of ﬁve words (three negative, one
positive and one neutral), and, ﬁnally, the subjects with a
panic disorder, who only registered three words, one of
each valence.
In depressed subjects and in subjects without psycho-
logical disorders, we observed that some words presented
a longer latency time and, simultaneously, higher
averages of event recall. In this situation, both groups
registered two negative words and a positive one. In
subjects with panic disorder, this relation was not
established with any word.
Between both evaluations of depressed subjects, there
were differences. Thus, in the ﬁrst evaluation, there were
19 words with higher latency time averages (nine of
negative valence, six of positive valence and four neutral),
whereas in the second evaluation, there were fourteen
words (three negative, six positive and ﬁve neutral).
Hence, unlike what happened in the ﬁrst evaluation, in
the second, the number of negative words was inferior to
the ones with other valences.
The group that registered more words with a lower
latency time was the panic disorder one. They registered
seven words (one of negative valence, one of positive
valence and ﬁve neutral), whereas the depressed subjects
and the ones without psychological disorders registered
two words (one negative and one neutral).
In the case of these two groups, both words belonged to
the group of words that had a lower average of event
recall. This fact could be associated with the kind of
answers triggered by these words, in which subjects
rapidly responded, e.g., ‘I can’t recall any event’.
Analysis by Events
The depressed subjects recalled more events than any
other group in this study. In the ﬁrst evaluation, the
depressed subjects’ average for event recall was superior
to the one shown in the second evaluation. However, the
differences were not signiﬁcant (p> 0.05).
Comparing the event recall averages according to their
valence, we noticed that depressed subjects, as well as
panic disorder subjects and the ones without psycho-
logical disorders, recalled signiﬁcantly more negative
events than positive ones (p< 0.05). The three groups
did not present signiﬁcant differences, among themselves,
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regarding the event recall averages of positive and
negative events. This result led to the rejection of our
ﬁrst hypothesis, which stated that depressed individuals
would recall more negative autobiographical memories
than subjects from the other groups. However, depressed
subjects did present the highest average of negative
events’ recall, followed by subjects with panic disorder
and subjects without psychological disorders. As for
positive events, depressed subjects and those without
psychological disorders presented similar averages, both
superior to the ones presented by individuals with panic
disorder. These results indicate that depressed subjects
recall more events and, preferentially, negative ones.
Thus, the difference between the depressed participants
and the participants without psychological disorders is
related to the ease with which the former recall negative
life events and not with the processing of positive
information.
In the depressed patients’ evaluations, we also observed
a signiﬁcantly superior average of negative event recall
compared with positive recall. In the ﬁrst evaluation, the
average of negative events recalled was higher than the
one registered in the second evaluation. In the positive
events, no such difference was found. These results
reinforce what we previously stated when we mentioned
that the ease of negative event recall would be related
with the severity of depression.
Word Valence Analysis
The negative words allowed for higher event recall
averages in all groups.
In depressed subjects, the average of events recalled
with negative words was signiﬁcantly superior to the
recall average with words from another valence,
whereas in panic disorder subjects, this only occurred
regarding the neutral words and in subjects without
psychological disorders, regarding positive words. The
results obtained by depressed subjects conﬁrmed our
second hypothesis, which suggested that depressed
subjects would recall more autobiographical memories
when the stimulus word was negative than when it was
positive or neutral.
In the depressed subjects’ group, the negative and
positive words had a higher event recall averages than in
any other group. However, there was no signiﬁcant
difference, which led to the rejection of our third
hypothesis, in which we stated that depressed subjects
would recall signiﬁcantly more autobiographic memories
with negative stimulus words when compared with the
other subjects. However, the results did indicate that
depressed subjects showed a preference for processing
and recalling information with negative characteristics, as
we had defended.
Regarding neutral words, depressed subjects and those
without psychological disorders presented similar event
recall averages, being that panic disorder subjects
presented lower ones. This result is in accordance with
what was stated in the previous paragraph.
In the depressed subjects’ ﬁrst evaluation, we noted a
signiﬁcantly higher event recall average with negative
words by comparison with neutral words. Thus, de-
pressed subjects presented the same valence relation as
the panic disorder ones.
In the second evaluation, no signiﬁcant differences were
observed. In comparison with the ﬁrst evaluation, the
event recall averages were superior in negative and
positive words and similar in neutral words. Again, the
role of depression severity in the processing and recall of
negative information was observed.
Depressed subjects presented signiﬁcantly higher la-
tency times when compared with the other groups in any
of the word valences—negative, positive and neutral. This
fact could be related with the characteristic cognitive
slowing of depressed subjects. They presented a longer
latency time with positive words, whereas subjects
without psychological disorders presented longer latency
times regarding negative words. However, the differences
were not signiﬁcant in either case. Being so, the depressed
subjects’ results rejected our fourth hypothesis, which
stated that depressed subjects would present quicker
response times for negative words when compared with
the ones presented in positive and neutral words.
However, the results did suggest a bigger difﬁculty for
depressed subjects to recall events stimulated by positive
words, i.e., they would have more difﬁculties processing
positive information and thereby searching and recalling
life events of this valence. In subjects without psycho-
logical disorders, the opposite occurs, i.e., they respond
quicker to a positive stimulation than to a negative one.
This reinforces the hypothesis stating that in depressed
subjects, there is a bigger difﬁculty in processing and
recalling positive information and, simultaneously, a
bigger ease when these processes face negative informa-
tion. In subjects with panic disorder, the latency time
averages were similar in both valences. All groups
recorded lower averages in face of neutral words.
However, the fact that depressed subjects recorded a
signiﬁcantly higher average when compared with the
others reinforced our belief in the existence of a cognitive
slowing.
In the depressed subjects’ ﬁrst evaluation, the latency
time average for positive and negative words was
longer than the one recorded in the second evaluation.
As for the neutral words, the relation was the opposite.
Despite this, the differences were not signiﬁcant
(p≥ 0.05) (see Table 3). This result showed the non‐
existence of a relation between latency time and
depression severity.
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Depressed subjects used categorical memories more
often than extended ones, with the opposite occurring in
individuals with panic disorder. Subjects without psycho-
logical disorders presented exactly the same values for
both memory types. This result conﬁrmed our ﬁfth
hypothesis, which stated that depressed subjects would
recall more categorical memories than extended ones
when compared with the other groups. In both evalua-
tions of the depressed subjects, they recalled more
categorical memories than extended ones. This result,
together with the one registered in our enlarged sample of
depressed subjects, seems to clearly state that depressed
subjects tend to use categorical memories. According to
Williams and Dritschel (1992), these memories are
associated with a less extensive search of memory
material and a ﬂaw in the supervisory attentional system
(Shallice, 1988), which would make the process of
searching for mnesic material more difﬁcult, creating
additional difﬁculties in accessing the second moment in
memory hierarchy, referred by Conway and Pleydell‐
Pearce (2000) and Williams (2004). The results that we
found are congruent with the previously referred studies.
To systematize the results obtained by the different
groups and by the depressed subjects in both evaluations,
we have chosen to synthesize the most relevant ones.
Synthesis of the Results
Depressed Subjects
1. They recalled more events in more words, with a
predominance in the negative words.
2. They presented higher latency times in more
words. There was a relation, in some words, between
the latency times presented and a superior event recall.
3. It was the group that recalled more events.
4. It was the group that presented a higher recall average
of negative events.
5. They recalled signiﬁcantly more negative than posi-
tive events.
6. It was the group that recalled more events with
negative words.
7. They recalled signiﬁcantly more events with negative
words than with positive or neutral ones.
8. In the three groups of different word valence
(positive, negative and neutral), they presented
signiﬁcantly higher latency times when compared
with the two other groups.
9. They used more categorical than extended memories.
Subjects with Panic Disorder
1. They recalled events in the same number of words as
subjects without psychological disorders.
2. It was the group that recorded higher latency times in
a lower number of words.
3. They had an inferior event recall average, when
compared with depressed subjects, and an almost
equal one to the subjects without psychological
disorders.
4. They presented an inferior negative event recall
average in comparison with depressed subjects.
5. They recalled signiﬁcantly more negative than posi-
tive events.
6. They recalled more events with negative words than
the subjects without psychological disorders.
7. They recalled signiﬁcantly more events with negative
than with neutral words. They also recalled more
events with negative than with positive words, but
the difference was not signiﬁcant.
Subjects without Psychological Disorders
1. They recalled more events in the same number of
words as the panic disorder subjects.
2. They presented higher latency times in lesser words
than the depressed subjects but in more words than
the panic disorder subjects. In some words, a relation
between these times and a superior event recall
existed.
3. They had an event recall average nearly identical to
that of the panic disorder subjects.
4. Although they had a signiﬁcantly superior negative
event recall average, in comparison with positive
event recall average, their negative event recall
average was the lowest of the three groups.
5. They had the smallest average, of the three groups,
regarding negative words event recall.
6. They signiﬁcantly recalled more events with negative
words by comparison with positive ones.
Depressed Subjects’ First Evaluation
1. Their proﬁle regarding the recall of events in different
words was similar to the one shown in the enlarged
sample of depressed subjects.
2. They presented a greater number of words with high
latency times than they did in the second evaluation,
with a special incidence on negative words and with a
strong relation to the words that had bigger event
recall.
3. They had a superior event recall average when
compared with that in the second evaluation and in
the enlarged sample of depressed subjects.
4. They recalled signiﬁcantly more negative than posi-
tive events.
5. They presented a negative event recall average
superior to the one in the second evaluation.
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6. They recalled signiﬁcantly more events with negative
words than with neutral ones. They also recalled more
events with negative than with positive words,
although the difference here was not signiﬁcant.
Depressed Subjects’ second Evaluation
1. They presented a relation between event recall in
different words that was similar to the one registered
in the ﬁrst evaluation and in the enlarged sample of
depressed subjects.
2. They recorded higher latency times, especially in
positive words.
3. They recalled signiﬁcantly more negative than posi-
tive events.
4. They presented a negative words event recall average
superior to the one registered in positive and neutral
words. The event recall averages with positive and
neutral words were identical.
DISCUSSION
The results demonstrate the existence, in depressed
subjects, of a predominant processing, retention and
recall of negative information. These aspects are related,
according to some theoretical models, with a
reinforcement of negative emotions. In depressed sub-
jects, the preferential recall of negative events allows the
maintenance and reinforcement of negative emotions,
such as sadness, that are associated with the loss of
valued objectives or with the impossibility to attain such
valued goals.
Our results are also congruent with the relation between
emotions and self‐schema contents. Thus, in depressed
patients, a given negative emotion stops being related
only to the situation that triggered it, and would become
more general, and congruent with the schema. The results
illustrate this generalization of the preference for process-
ing and recalling negative information, independent of
the stimulus words presented, which demonstrates the
existence, in the depressed subject, of a negative content
self‐schema. This schema would imply an information
processing environment congruent with its negative
valence. We can consider these aspects as an explanation
for the recall of negative events with words from different
valences, as was observed in depressed subjects. These
studies also reinforce what was stated by the Interacting
Cognitive Subsystems model (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993)
regarding the activation of a previously existing schematic
model, which was triggered by the information processing
that was, somehow, related to it.
The decrease in positive information recall and process-
ing either through less frequent recall or through a cog-
nitive slowing that allows the maintenance of negative
information is also consistent with the existence of negative
self‐schemas that impair the information processing of
discordant emotional valences. Because autobiographical
memories are related to the self, there is a possible jus-
tiﬁcation for the depressed subjects’ greater number of
recalled events and the predominance of negative events
among those that are recalled.
Our results also show that we cannot focus on depres-
sive memory deﬁcits in only one way, since there is a
variability associated with the depression’s severity.
Hence, when the depression is less severe, the subjects
would not manifest memory deﬁcit characteristics, such
as negative bias and cognitive slowing. In these cases, our
results show that depressed subjects show a similar
proﬁle to the one presented by subjects without psycho-
pathological disorders, in terms of information processing
and recall.
By interpreting the results of our study, we are led to
question negative thoughts as responsible for the onset of
depression. We believe that the onset and maintenance of
depression is intimately related to the information encod-
ing process and later recall, given the negative contents of
the self’s schemas. This factor could also lead to vulner-
ability for depression. We believe that these factors should
be taken into account in the conceptualization process and
psychotherapeutic intervention.
We consider that it is fundamental to work with the
depressed subjects’ capacity to process and recall positive
information. We think that one of the possible ways to do
so is by modifying the encoding process, thereby allowing
for the repair of negative information processing and
recall, and of negative content of the self‐schemas.
We believe that these should be core aspects in the
psychotherapeutic process of depressed individuals. Also,
the intervention directed to the ambivalent self, which we
observed in depressed patients, may enable the integra-
tion of the positive aspects of the self in the process of
encoding and recalling information, thus enabling the
repair process of the implications of negative information
in the recalling of depressed patients.
With the objective of a better understanding of the
relations between depression and memory processes, we
propose that future investigations focus on comparing
subjects with major depressive disorder with those with
other psychopathology. The use of experimental tasks in a
bigger sample of subjects with major depressive disorder
and no medication, and the existence of a follow‐up after
a cognitive psychotherapy treatment, are important
aspects to explore.
We also believe that the relations between autobio-
graphical memory, early maladaptive schemas, styles of
attachment and interpersonal relationships should be taken
into account. These relations may allow a more robust
understanding of the several factors that can inﬂuence
the encoding and recall process and, consequently, the
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origin andmaintenance of depression, thus allowing amore
effective psychotherapeutic intervention.
We propose that future investigations focus on compar-
ing participants with major depressive disorder with those
with other psychopathologies so that we can better
understand the relations between depression and memory
processes. The use of experimental tasks in a larger sample
of participants with major depressive disorder and no
medication, and the existence of a follow‐up after a cog-
nitive psychotherapy treatment, are important aspects
to explore.
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